@dik, that set of statements is actually quite a good basis for exploring some of the issues.
The UK has decided to leave
I think this is true, but the reason it’s true is not the one which most commentators think it is (and the one which many dispute). There’s a lot of debate around the 2016 referendum, based on discussions about whether it was a legally binding vote (it wasn’t), whether the majority in favour was definitive (by comparison with all (both) previous UK-wide referenda, the majority was wafer-thin and with wide regional variations - though there is no credible suggestion that the count is significantly in error) and whether Leave voters realised they were voting for what is now on offer (the campaign certainly promised them something substantially more attractive, but the question on the ballot paper was much more straightforward than that).
Notwithstanding all of that, it is indisputably clear that the UK has decided to leave. The mechanism for that is that Parliament (which absolutely does have the power to make binding decisions) has made that decision, has passed legislation to make it so and has given the requisite notice under Article 50 of the Treaty of Rome.
Why spend so much time laying out that distinction? Because although a lot of effort has gone into telling the public that their referendum decision is binding, irrevocable and sacred (and that asking whether they subsequently changed their minds would be a betrayal both of them and of democracy), the fact is that the genuinely binding decision was one made by Parliament and that, for now, Parliament also has the power to change it’s mind. The party in government now has a working parliamentary majority of just one, there is a lot of Brexit dissent within their own ranks, they depend on the support of the Democratic Unionist Party (who have their own views on the subject) and the main opposition party has its own Brexit divisions. That all makes it very difficult to be sure what the UK will have decided to do by the time we get to October 31st. Worth noting at this point that the Rome Treaty isn’t awfully clear on whether a member has any right to revoke it’s invocation of Article 50 - could be worth booking a front seat for that fight now, while tickets are still cheap.
The UK (previous government) has come up with an acceptable agreement for leaving.
This statement is only partly true. The agreement was acceptable to the other members of the EU, and was acceptable to the UK Ministers who “agreed” it - but it wasn’t acceptable to Parliament and, under the UK system, Ministers aren’t empowered to bind the nation to treaties without the authority of Parliament. With the DUP (remember, the Government depends on them for their majority) implacably opposed to a key provision of the agreement and a ready supply of rebels on the government benches, that approval proved utterly out of reach.
The UK (current government) has decided to discard the agreed to terms
After Parliament had voted three times in a row to reject the withdrawal agreement (inflicting in one case the worst parliamentary defeat of a Government motion in modern history), the incoming Government had little choice.
The UK government has to leave without an agreement
Semantic point first. If there’s leaving to be done, it will be the UK that leaves, not just the UK Government. While the default position (given the current state of the law) is that the UK will leave without a deal, the precarious state of the UK Government and the interests of the rest of the EU leave open some other possibilities.
First is that Parliament will try to turn the whole thing off. Parliament has the right to do this. Many MPs would love to exercise that right, but the effort that has gone into persuading the public that this would be undemocratic, and the consequent toxic environment for politicians across the board that would now follow such a change of path may be sufficient to deter many of them. This approach would need the agreement of the other EU nations, but there’s little doubt that agreeing to it would be massively in their own interest.
Second is that time could be found to negotiate a mutually and genuinely acceptable deal. Realistically (and especially given the current pace of engagement), there isn’t time to negotiate effectively between now and the end of October - and the new UK Prime Minister has staked his reputation on there being no further delays, so the UK side has already made this a very difficult option. Then there’s the question of how open the rest of the EU would be to resuming negotiations.
If I were the EU, after spending a couple of years coming up with a ‘final’ separation, I would not look forward to opening a new agreement. Time’s up.
The EU negotiators are seasoned dealmakers. No doubt they’re royally frustrated by the way the current agreement has faltered, but they should be relied upon to keep the best interests of the EU in their sights.
There are three significant areas that the EU team will have in mind.
One is the queue of other members who are watching Brexit developments with a view to setting off along the same path themselves. Although this provides an extra incentive for the EU not to roll over in favour of the UK, rolling over (in the sense of giving up more than would be fair and reasonable) would not be in the EU interest anyway. Strangely, this “integrity of the Union” argument could end up having a bigger impact on the UK than it does on the EU, with the status of both Scotland and Northern Ireland coming back under the microscope.
Keeping the UK in the Union would be better for the EU economy than letting them go under the terms of any foreseeable deal - and both of those would be better than a no-deal departure. From the UK perspective, there are economic disadvantages to a no-deal departure - the only arguments are about whether those disadvantages would be severe and enduring.
The factor that is likely to be most difficult - and which destroyed any chance of the current deal getting through the UK Parliament - is the treatment of the Irish border. The Republic of Ireland stands to lose massively in the event of a no-deal Brexit - at least economically, and potentially also in security terms. At the moment, the kind of changes to the deal being demanded by the UK Brexiteers (egged on by the DUP, for whom this is an existential issue) would be equally catastrophic for the Republic. For the EU idly to abandon the Republic to either of those two fates would be a true betrayal (possibly the first time in any of these debates that the word has been used in any sense that the compilers of the dictionary would recognise) and would stand to destroy trust throughout the EU. The trouble of course is that finding a deal that leaves the Republic united with the rest of the EU without imposition of special rules, leaves the Irish land border open, keeps Northern Ireland united with the rest of the UK without special rules, yet still doesn’t bind the UK to EU trade rules is brain-meltingly difficult. With last week having seen the fiftieth anniversary of the start of Op BANNER, the UK faces a similar dilemma.
There’s lots of choices available to both parties - none of them without the likelihood of pain. I think it’s too hard to tell what will happen over the next few weeks, but public trust in the ability of British politicians to “make stuff work” has already been dented and will take a long time to recover.